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Abstract: 
The importance of territory is undeniable, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that 
throughout history territorial disputes have been the principal source of conflict leading to war. 
However, while wars are often linked to territorial disputes, territorial disputes often pose little 
risk of war. The differences between the territorial disputes that lead to conflict and those that 
do not are essential, for within them is the key to identifying the causes of war, predicting sites 
of future conflict, and preventing conflict. 
This research seeks to expand understanding of how violent or peaceful resolutions to 
territorial disputes are linked with bilateral trade and cultural and institutional differences and 
similarities. Through this research, the theories of economic interdependence, the clash of 
civilizations, and the democratic peace are examined as they apply to the decision-making 
processes of challengers in territorial disputes. Through a combination of a quantitative analysis 
and cases studies, the results revealed that the theories of economic interdependence and 
democratic peace were broadly supported in their application to territorial disputes, while the 
theory of the clash of civilizations was not. Thus, the continued proliferation of trade and 
democracy shows promise in increasing the likelihood of peaceful negotiated solutions to 
territorial disputes around the world. 
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Preface: Motivation and Acknowledgements 
Michael was ready for war. I was not. I was contentedly planning to spend my first 
Spring Festival in China with him and his family, experiencing the customs of the Bai minority 
group with the first friend I had made in China. While he welcomed my visit, he warned that he 
would be unavailable if China went to war with Japan. In that case, he informed me that he 
would join the army to defend China's claim to the barren rocks in the East China Sea called the 
Diaoyu Islands by the Chinese and the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese. 
Even if I had been unaware of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute before the start of my 
year abroad, I would have been quickly disabused of my ignorance. Nationalist TV reporters and 
belligerent train passengers continuously explained to me the fault in Japan’s imperialist claim. 
This, along with the Western media’s insistence on explaining the dispute as the aggression of a 
rising power, engendered in me a desire to more fully understand the forces at work. 
This conversation led me to choose to do a thesis on territorial disputes. It was shocking 
to me how impassioned my friend got over a small and uninhabited (though strategically and 
economically important) group of rocks thousands of miles away. Before I traveled to China the 
very idea of China and Japan going to war over the islands seemed ridiculous. Why jeopardize 
the millions upon millions of dollars’ worth of trade and investment in both countries? The 
passion and emotion displayed made the possibility a reality.  
The next seventy-some pages are all part of my attempt to better understand these 
complex issues and to share that understanding with those interested. I could not have done 
this work without the help of Jake Douglas and Grace Perkins, both of whom helped me 
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transfer my thoughts onto paper. I would also like to thank Professor T.J. Cheng, who supported 
me even as we were hundreds of miles apart, as well as Dennis Smith, Mike Tierney, Kim Van 
Deusen, and Chris Payton, all of whom supported me in their own way. Also, William Camarda, 
Jeanne and Patrick Cumby, Betty Burgner, Maria Marinelli, and David and Mary Lynn Kolhoff all 
helped support my summer honors research financially; the final product would not be as good 
without that extra time. Finally, I would like to thank Michael for helping me see the issue more 
clearly. 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
"I shall never sell the land! Bit by bit, I will dig up the fields and feed the earth itself to 
the children and when they die I will bury them in the land, and I and my wife and my old 
father, even he, we will die on the land that has given us birth."1  
Wang Lung in The Good Earth by Pearl Buck 
 In the eyes of Wang Lung, land is life. For states facing challenges to their sovereignty 
through territorial disputes, land represents a similarly indispensable element of their survival. 
For politicians, territorial disputes represent the possibility of electoral victory or defeat; for 
citizens, they represent the heartlands of their ancestors as well as the strength or weakness of 
the nation. Politicians like Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe demonstrate the importance of 
territorial disputes by continuing to stress that “the Senkaku islands are inherently Japanese 
territory” even as the dispute drives a wedge ever deeper into Sino-Japanese relations.2 
                                                             
1
 Pearl S. Buck, The Good Earth, (New York: Washington Square, 2004), 61.  
2
 Linda Sieg, "Japan's Shinzo Abe: Comeback Kid with Conservative Agenda," Reuters, Thomson Reuters, December 
16, 2012. 
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Protesters in Manila demonstrate territory’s importance to them as they march through the 
streets demanding the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as China) respect 
Philippine sovereignty in the South China Seas. In Argentina, politicians and a supportive public 
protest that the United Kingdom “has refused to return [las Malvinas (the Falkland Islands)] to 
the Argentine Republic, thus preventing it from restoring its territorial integrity.”3  
The existence of the modern state is inextricably linked with the ability of that state to 
exert sovereignty over territory.4 Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties of States codified this concept into international law by explicitly laying out “a 
defined territory” as an essential qualification for statehood. Territory also serves as a source 
for raw materials, a strategic staging area, a real world target of nationalist energies, and, in a 
basic sense, a measure of state power.5 
The importance of territory is undeniable, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that 
“throughout history territorial disputes have been the principal source of conflict leading to 
war.”6 While territorial conquest has become looked down on as a regular functioning of the 
state since the end of World War II, territorial disputes remain a central feature in the 
international system, with over one hundred disputes since 1945, many of which have yet to be 
resolved.7 Moreover, territorial disputes have played a central or supplementary role in many 
                                                             
3 "Argentina Reignites Falklands Row with Newspaper Letter," BBC News, January 3, 2013.  
4 Beth Simmons, "Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial 
Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46. no. 6 (2002), 829-856; Sumner 2004 
5 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, (London: Routledge, 1992), 14-20. 
6 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 1996), 6-7; Tuomas Forsberg, "Explaining Territorial Disputes: From Power Politics to Normative 
Reasons," Journal of Peace Research. 33. no. 4 (1996), 433-449; J. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan, "Territorial Disputes 
and the Probability of War, 1816-1992," Journal of Peace Research 38.2 (2001), 123-38; Herschel I. Grossman, 
Peace and War in Territorial Disputes, (Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2004), 1. 
7 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 5-7. 
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of the world’s most recent conflicts as well as a number of currently contentious international 
relationships. Consider, if you will, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Ethiopia-Eritrea war, the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the conflict over Kashmir, and the rocky relations between China and 
Japan due to their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Territorial disputes played a part in 
them all.  
However, while wars are often linked to territorial disputes, territorial disputes often 
pose little risk of war.8 The differences between the territorial disputes that lead to conflict and 
those that do not are essential, for within them is the key to identifying the causes of war, 
predicting sites of future conflict, and preventing conflict.  
I undertook this research to expand understanding of how violent or peaceful 
resolutions to territorial disputes are linked with bilateral trade and cultural and institutional 
differences and similarities. Through this research, I explored the theories of economic 
interdependence, the clash of civilizations, and the democratic peace and how they applied in 
the decision-making processes of challengers in territorial disputes. Through a combination of a 
quantitative analysis and cases studies, the results revealed that the theories of economic 
interdependence and democratic peace were broadly supported in their application to 
territorial disputes, while the theory of the clash of civilizations was not.  
I will begin by overviewing past literature on the subject of territorial disputes before 
examining the competing theories of trade, culture, and institutions as they apply to territorial 
disputes. After outlining several suspected hypotheses, I then describe the methodology used 
in the obtaining and analyzing of the quantitative data. I next set out the results of the 
                                                             
8 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 7; Grossman, Peace and War in Territorial Disputes, 1. 
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quantitative analysis and discuss their significance. Finally, I explore the effect of trade, culture, 
and institutions in-depth through three case studies. 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theory 
 Past research on territorial disputes fits well into realist, liberal, or constructivist views 
of international relations. However, it should be noted that many if not most researchers 
combine aspects of two or three theories in seeking to explain the differing conclusions of 
territorial disputes.9 In general, scholars tend to debate the strongest explanatory variables 
rather than discounting others entirely.  
 
A Realist Approach to Territorial Disputes 
 Realist explanations of the violent or peaceful resolution of territorial disputes rest 
largely in power politics.10 They focus on explanatory variables such as differences in military 
power, the economic and strategic value of disputed land, and state credibility and their effect 
on the outcome of territorial disputes.11 Power explanations view asymmetrical military power 
balances as more likely to end peacefully as weaker states curb to the demands of their 
stronger neighbors.12  Explanations focused on the value of the disputed land, whether 
economic or strategic, see conflict more likely in highly valued land as the cost of compromise, 
causing each state to lose a portion of the territory, becomes greater.13 Researchers focused on 
                                                             
9 Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1994. 
10 Forsberg, "Explaining Territorial Disputes," 433-449. 
11
 Goertz and Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, 86-90; Huth, Standing Your Ground, 156; 
Grossman, Peace and War in Territorial Disputes, 2-4. 
12
 Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change, 669-71 
13 Goertz and Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, 14-20; Huth, Standing Your Ground, 178-9. 
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state credibility, meanwhile, see peaceful settlement of disputes possible only if “promises not 
to attack are credible,” making higher credibility of both states lead to more peaceful 
outcomes.14 Overall, these Realist explanations seek to explain territorial disputes as if the 
states involved were unitary actors, combatants of different size, strength, and reliability 
fighting over prizes of varying value. Liberal explanations, meanwhile, explore the inner 
workings of states and the effects of international organizations. 
 
A Liberal Approach to Territorial Disputes 
 Liberal explanations tend to focus on political regimes, economic integration, diplomatic 
globalization, and domestic politics. Research on the effect of differences in political regimes on 
the outcomes of territorial disputes is especially prolific, as it supports the well-known theory of 
the democratic peace, which states that democracies will not go to war with each other. 
Likewise, this explanation theorizes that states that are both democracies are unlikely to have 
violent conclusions to territorial disputes.15  
Research examining the effect of economic globalization on territorial disputes is a 
recent addition to the field, with researchers measuring whether levels of foreign direct 
investment affects the resolution of disputes.16 This research views higher levels of foreign 
direct investment as leading to more peaceful and conciliatory behavior in disputes.17 Other 
research has examined the economic incentives involved in settling of territorial disputes, 
                                                             
14 Grossman, Peace and War in Territorial Disputes, 4-18. 
15 Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 2002), 5-18; Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change, 44-8. 
16
 Hoon Lee, "Economic Globalization and Territorial Disputes," Economic Globalization and Territorial Disputes, 
http://www.guleninstitute.org/publications/analyses/294-economic-globalization-and-territorial-disputes-
122.html.  
17 Ibid. 
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claiming that disputes stifle bilateral trade as well as economic activity around the disputed 
border, which thus acts as an incentive for both sides to settle disputes.18  
The diplomatic intervention explanation views intervention by a third party, whether 
biased toward one party or not, as leading an increased possibility of a peaceful settlement, 
using the Camp David Accords and the Papal intervention in South America as evidence.19 
Researchers focusing on domestic politics view irredentist claims and the nationalist claims they 
inspire as variables making violent outcomes to territorial disputes more likely.20  
Explanations of domestic politics can be contradictory in other aspects. Some 
researchers claim that domestic unrest is likely to lead to peaceful outcomes as states seek to 
stabilize their international situation so they can focus on internal affairs, while others claim 
that states will seek war as a diversion from internal dissatisfaction.21 With dueling evidence of 
peaceful resolution by China and Nepal during the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and war between 
Argentina and Great Britain when the Argentine regime was unpopular, both explanations are 
difficult to generalize. 
 
A Constructivist Approach to Territorial Disputes 
 Constructivist explanations focus on norms of international law and morality and 
cultural narratives. The explanation of international law is similar to that of democratic 
institutions, stating that if countries share a common understanding of international law then 
                                                             
18 Simmons, "Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance,” 829-856. 
19 Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change, 48-51. 
20
 Huth, Standing Your Ground, 80-5. 
21
 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes, 
(Princeton: Princeton, 2008), 22-24; Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland 
Islands," Security Studies 15.3 (2006): 431-63. 
8 
 
peaceful settlement is more likely.22 Cultural narratives are used by researchers to explain the 
popular cultural beliefs that lead people to place value on certain territory. These narratives can 
lead to peaceful or violent outcomes depending on their content.23   
This research will focus on the decisions of states in three distinct stages of territorial 
disputes as identified by Paul Huth and Todd Allee, namely the status quo stage, the 
negotiation state, and the escalation stage.24 Within the status quo stage, the challenger in the 
dispute has the option to follow the status quo, threaten the use of force, or initiate talks. In 
the negotiation stage, the challenger has the option to offer concessions or not, while in the 
escalation stage the challenger has the option to escalate to a militarized conflict or not. 
This research will examine the effects of institutional similarity, cultural similarity, and 
economic integration on those decisions. While Paul Huth and Todd Allee have made extensive 
and valuable contributions to the literature in their research on the democratic peace and 
territorial conflict, this research will examine the variable within the context of culture and 
economics.25 Past research on the effect of cultural similarities in territorial disputes is almost 
nonexistent, so this research attempt to add this crucial dimension to the study of conflict and 
territorial disputes. The effect of economic integration on territorial disputes, meanwhile, has 
received little attention in past research. Hoon Lee has examined the effect of FDI flows on the 
decisions of states in the three stages of disputes, and found that increased flows reduced the 
chance of militarized conflict.26 This research will examine this claim in further depth, using 
                                                             
22 Kacowicz, Peaceful Territorial Change, 46-8; Forsberg, "Explaining Territorial Disputes," 433-449. 
23 Ariel Zellman, "Security or Identity? Narratives of State & Nation in International Territorial Conflict Protraction," 
PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2012. 
24
 Huth and Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century, Chapter 2. 
25
 Ibid. 
26 Lee, "Economic Globalization and Territorial Disputes." 
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total trade flows to examine a variable that is especially pertinent to the disputes that are most 
in the news today, such as those between China and its neighbors. 
Readers interested in the causes behind territorial disputes or the rationale behind 
states seeking third-part arbitration versus bilateral negotiations or the International Court of 
Justice will have to look elsewhere.27 
 
 
The Theory of Economic Interdependence and Peace 
The theory that trade and economic interdependence are conducive for interstate 
peace finds its theoretical underpinnings in Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay, “Perpetual Peace.”28 
From these initial ideas has sprung a large and lively academic literature on economic 
interdependence and peace. Outside of academia, the theory gained a large following before 
the First World War with Woodrow Wilson as its flag-bearer, and then lost traction following 
the Second World War. However, since the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, 
the theory of economic interdependence has become increasingly popular. It has, in 
conjunction with the theory of the democratic peace, become a key assumption at the heart of 
much of U.S. foreign policy. The benefits of trade for peace have become so prevalent so as to 
have become a part of the national mind set. This is evident in the fact that currently, people 
arguing that war is likely between China and Japan or China and the United States must first 
                                                             
27
 Look at Forsberg 1996 for the causes behind territorial disputes and Simmons 2002, Copeland 1999, and Sumner 
2004 for the rationale behind states seeking third-part arbitration versus bilateral negotiations or going to the 
International Court of Justice. 
28 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, (New York: Liberal Arts, 1957). 
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prove that the idea is not as preposterous as it may seem given the spectacular levels of trade 
between them.29 
The most commonly articulated mechanism behind the theory is simple. First, it 
assumes that trade is beneficial for both parties. War or conflict will slow or halt trade 
altogether, adding an additional cost to the states in terms of the lost benefits from trade.30 In 
essence, the theory states that trade raises the opportunity cost of engaging in militarized 
actions. 
Hoon Lee identified one mechanism through which foreign direct investment in 
particular (not necessary from the other disputant state) influences territorial disputes.31 As 
conflict threatens to break out in a region, investors put a significant amount of pressure on 
disputant governments to compromise in order to protect their investments. For example, 
Japanese investors threatened to cease their investment in Chechnya until the violence over 
the issue of Chechnyan independence was resolved in Russia.32 Similarly, foreign direct 
investment can increase the cost of pursuing territorial disputes for states as investment flees 
conflict-prone areas.33 
In the era of globalization and extensive trade, war is made so expensive that few states 
will choose to engage in it, and are instead much more likely to seek compromise. Thus, the 
                                                             
29 Allison Jackson, "War between Japan and China Is an Accident Waiting to Happen," GlobalPost, November 25, 
2013. 
30 Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security, 
Vol. 20, no.4 (Spring 1996). 
31
 Lee, "Economic Globalization and Territorial Disputes." 
32
 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
11 
 
policy prescription that follows from this theory would be that states should seek to promote 
trade not only to enjoy the benefits of trade, but also to promote peace. 
 
Critiques to the Theory of Economic Interdependence 
There are several possible critiques to this theory. Academics such as Kenneth Waltz 
argue that the term “economic interdependence” is a misnomer, as it implies equality in 
dependence, which is not the case. Rather, Waltz argues, there is significant inequality in 
dependence in trade, creating leverage over the more dependent state. 34 Moreover, Waltz 
points out that great powers are largely immune to the pacifying effect of trade, since the 
majority of great power trade takes place within borders rather than across them.35 Thus, 
economic interdependence not only has very little pacifying effect on great power relations, but 
also has the potential to have the reverse effect as the less dependent state uses the economic 
dependence as leverage against the more dependent state.36 
However, Waltz fails to take into account that while states may use unequal economic 
dependence as leverage in international relations, it does not necessarily mean that economic 
interdependence is not a cause of peace. As a source of power and leverage, economic 
dependence could well be a force for peace by providing states with a non-violent method of 
coercion. Whereas in the past there were few policies available to foreign policy-makers 
                                                             
34
 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," PS: Political Science and Politics, 32.4 (1999), 693. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative 
Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 16.04 (1974), 387.  
12 
 
beyond war-making, economic interdependence adds tools such as sanctions, tariffs, and 
export bans. 
This economic leverage has been used a number of times in recent history. The West is 
currently taking advantage of Iran’s comparative economic dependence on the world in the 
form of sanctions to try to restict Tehran’s nuclear program.37 In 2013, China exploited Japan’s 
dependence on Chinese exports of rare earth metals to force Tokyo to extradite a Chinese 
fishing boat captain arrested for purposely colliding with a Japanese coast guard vessel near the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.38 In both of these situations, states, like Waltz suggested they 
would, leveraged economic dependence in order to achieve foreign policy goals. However, 
what Waltz does not recognize is that it is partially through that economic leveraging that 
economic interdependence acts as a force of peace, since it has, in both cases, been used when 
military options were on the table, but were not chosen partially due to the existence of 
economic leverage. 
Waltz also points out the difference in economic interdependence between sensitivity 
and vulnerability.39 While states may by sensitive to sudden cuts in trade, meaning that they 
experience an immediate drop in welfare, that does not mean they are at all as vulnerable to 
stopping trade, meaning that their welfare returns to close to previous levels in the long-run.40 
Waltz argues that most talk about economic interdependence is considering sensitivity rather 
                                                             
37 While multilateral sanctions may seem like they do not belong as a mechanism through which trade creates 
peace, consider the other possible reactions by the West to Tehran’s nuclear program—most scenarios include 
war. Through sanctions, states are able to coerce without violence.  
38
 Keith Bradsher, "In Dispute, China Blocks Rare Earth Exports to Japan," The New York Times, September 22, 2010. 
39
 Waltz, "Globalization and Governance.” 
40
 Raul Caruso, "The Impact of International Economic Sanctions on Trade: An Empirical Analysis," Peace Economics, 
Peace Science and Public Policy 9.2 (2003). 
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than vulnerability, and therefore fails to take into account both the actual possible causal 
mechanisms at play in trade as well as the abovementioned inequality in dependence.41 
Waltz’s arguments do not consider other possible pacifying effect of trade. For example, 
increased trade likely means a larger amount of person-to-person exchange, increasing 
empathy between the cultures.42 Furthermore, trade creates a large set of business and 
individuals whose livelihood is tied to continued positive relations between states, creating, 
especially in democratic countries, a powerful lobby in favor of compromise and peace 
regardless of a state’s overall economic dependence on the other state.43 
While Waltz and other academics may argue about the extent and the comparative 
degree to which countries experience additional costs to conflict due to economic 
interdependence, they all agree that additional costs do exist. This research will examine 
whether economic interdependence has a pacifying effect in territorial disputes by examining 
its effect on the decisions of challengers at two key moments in the negotiations process, 
namely the decision to do nothing (not challenge the status quo), engage in negotiations, or 
engage in a militarized action as well as the decision to offer concessions or not once the 
negotiation process has begun. The possible mechanisms at work will then be examined in 
through several case studies. 
 
Hypotheses on the Effect of Economic Interdependence on Territorial Disputes 
                                                             
41
 Waltz, "Globalization and Governance." 
42
 "10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System," World Trade Organization, 2008. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm. 
43 Ibid. 
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The large-n model will test three hypotheses regarding economic interdependence: 
1. There is a positive relationship between bilateral trade as a percentage of gross 
domestic product and the probability a challenger will seek a resolution of a 
territorial dispute through negotiations. 
2. There is a negative relationship between bilateral trade as a percentage of gross 
domestic product and the probability a challenger will escalate to higher levels in 
a militarized dispute. 
3. There is a positive relationship between bilateral trade as a percentage of gross 
domestic product a challenger will offer concessions in the negotiation process. 
It should be noted that there is a risk of false correlation in testing these hypotheses. 
First, as the gravity model of trade theory suggests, the closer states are to each other the 
greater their volume of trade.44 Territorial disputes are most likely to be initiated with 
neighbors, so territorial disputes are likely to be initiated between states that have the largest 
degree of economic interdependence. However, since these hypotheses test the resolution and 
negotiations of ongoing territorial disputes and not their initiation, this fact should not cause 
problems. 
 
The Theory of Culture in Territorial Disputes 
                                                             
44
 James E. Anderson, “The Gravity Model,” Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), 2001, pages 
133-160, 09.   
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The idea that culture matters in international relations derives its theoretical origins 
from the Constructivist school of thought championed by Alexander Wendt. While conceding 
that the international system is, as described by the Realist school of thought, anarchic, Wendt 
argues that “anarchy is what states make of it.”45 The constructivist point of view contends that 
states have identities that shape its behavior and, through it, the international system. A state’s 
identity affects its definition of its interests, and thus, its behavior.46 
 Around the same time that Wendt first published explaining the constructivist position, 
Samuel Huntington published his first article on his theory of the clash of civilizations. This 
theory introduced the idea that, in the post-Cold War era, civilizations rather than ideologies 
would divide the world.47 The theory took from ideas presented by Hans Morgenthau and 
Hedley Bull that cultural differences would be problematic in international politics and 
expanded on them greatly.48 According to Huntington, the most contentious points of conflict 
in the future would take place between seven discrete civilizations as identified by Huntington. 
The article received numerous critiques for a number of issues, most centrally for Huntington’s 
oversimplified classifications of civilizations.49 However, the majority of critics still admitted to 
the general idea of civilizations causing conflict was important.50 
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 In the aftermath of the publishing of these influential articles and the cataclysmic 
change that shook international relations theory due to the peaceful disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, the study of culture and its effect on a number of variable in international 
relations became a much more common subject.51 However, research has yet to be done 
concerning the effect of culture in territorial disputes. This research attempts to fill that gap in 
the literature. 
 The theory behind the effect of similarities or differences in culture on the resolution of 
territorial disputes follows the general idea presented in Huntington’s article that differences in 
culture effect the probability for peaceful or violent outcomes to territorial disputes. This could 
work through a number of mechanisms. 
 Similar cultures could have similar views of territory and similar norms regarding the 
“correct” way to acquire it, and could thus be more likely to agree and more willing to 
compromise than states that have different cultures that view territory and territorial 
acquisition differently. For example, a state that views conquest as a moral and legal method of 
acquiring territory would be more likely to accept another state’s territorial conquest as morally 
and legally sound. 
 Similar cultures could have greater understanding and empathy for each other, 
decreasing some of the domestic impetus for starting militarized conflict over territorial 
disputes. The decision to dispute territory or to begin a militarized conflict over it is often based 
on appealing to nationalism within the disputant government’s domestic audience, and since 
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populations with similar cultures are less likely to harbor such nationalistic hatred of each other, 
governments will have fewer benefits from beginning a conflict (or a dispute in the first place). 
The reverse of this is apparent in the dispute over the Falkland Islands, where Argentina chose 
to initiate a militarized conflict with Great Britain, a country with different culture, in order to 
appeal to domestic audiences.52 
 Similar cultures could also have similar political institutions, which could have similar 
bargaining structures, making states better able to navigate the other’s institutional structure. 
This aspect will be examined further in the next section.  
 These are just a few possible mechanisms through which similarities and differences in 
culture could affect the resolution of territorial disputes. This research will use a large-n 
quantitative study to determine whether culture plays any substantive role in the resolution of 
disputes, and then examine possible mechanisms through case studies. 
I will use two cultural measures to examine differences and similarities in culture and 
their effect on territorial disputes. The first measure is an amalgamation of questions from the 
World Values Survey put together by Ronald Ingelhart using factor analysis.53 This measure 
examines a society based on it being traditional or secular-legal and focused on survival or self-
expression using ten key questions from the survey. Finally, I will examine a second, somewhat 
lighthearted measure – the number of McDonalds in a country. While this is a measure 
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admittedly fraught with issues, it has a its roots in a long history of news print and academic 
research from The Economist’s Big Mac Index measuring consumer prices across countries to 
Thomas Friedman’s famous realization that no two countries that both had McDonalds had 
ever fought a war.54 In this research it will merely serve as an additional statistic meant to add 
depth and meaning to the other, more formal measure of culture. 
 
Hypotheses on the Effect of Culture in Territorial Disputes 
This research will test two hypotheses in regards to culture and its effect on the 
resolution of territorial disputes: 
1. There is an inverse relationship between the difference in scores of disputants’ 
on the Traditional/Secular-Rational scale and Survival/Self-Expression scale and 
the disputants’ probability of going to war over the territorial dispute. 
2. There is an inverse relationship between the difference in number of people per 
McDonalds in disputant countries and the disputants’ probability of going to war 
over the territorial dispute. 
 
The Theory of the Democratic Peace 
The idea that political institutions are important in the study of conflict derives from the 
democratic peace theory which, like the theory of economic interdependence, is also found in 
                                                             
54
 “The Big Mac Index." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, January 7. 2011; Thomas L. Friedman, "Foreign 
Affairs Big Mac I," The New York Times, December 7, 1996. 
19 
 
Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay, Perpetual Peace.55 From this founding principle, a rich academic 
literature was born. This theory, like that of economic interdependence, has achieved popular 
prominence and has been used by policy-makers to guide foreign policy and by pundits to 
criticize it. The theory of democratic peace has also become a part of the national mindset, 
tying the image of violence and despotism to authoritarian or non-democratic regimes and the 
aura of peace and prosperity to democratic governments. This is evident especially in the 
foreign policy of President George W. Bush, where the idea that democracies are inherently 
more peaceful played an instrumental role in instigating the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan.56 
Academics debate between two main schools of thought within the democratic peace 
literature. One, the “dyadic” school of thought, claims that democracies are less likely to go to 
war with each other, but are not inherently less aggressive that than non-democratic states.57 
The other, the “monadic” school of thought, claims that democracies are inherently less 
aggressive than their non-democratic counterparts.58 
There are two commonly discussed mechanisms through which the democratic peace 
works. The first contends that the democracies have norms that favor non-violent, negotiated 
approaches to conflict resolution while the second says that democratic institutions themselves 
favor negotiated settlements. Though scholars debate the comparative explanatory power of 
norms versus institutions as well as whether they apply solely to conflict between democratic 
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states or to conflict between democratic and non-democratic states, quantitative studies have 
difficulty separating the two in analysis.59 
The norms argument explains that democracies are based in a system where conflict is 
resolved peacefully through negotiation and compromise, which builds norms in democratic 
societies to do so in their foreign policy as well.60 In other terms, since in democratic societies 
violence is a socially inappropriate method of solving conflict between people or political 
parties, it follows that violence is also inappropriate when used to solve conflict between states. 
The institutional explanation of the democratic peace theory centers on the greater 
domestic accountability in democratic institutions. The argument is that political leaders in 
democracies face a high possibility of domestic opposition to decisions to use force, especially 
when the use of force is unsuccessful or leads to substantial loss of life.61 In a democratic 
system, unpopular use of force offers an opportunity for the opposition political party to gain 
support and, in the democratic electoral process, remove the current leader from office. Thus, 
democratic leaders will be very hesitant to use force due to concerns over the future of their 
political career.62  
 
Critiques to the Theory of the Democratic Peace 
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The institutional explanation of the democratic peace has been critiqued by some 
scholars who argue that rather than leading to less willingness to use force, domestic audience 
cost actually makes leaders less willing to offer concession in international disputes, and 
therefore leads to more conflict.63 The high political cost of retreating or offering concessions in 
international affairs can lead to domestic discontent. While non-democratic regimes can 
suppress this discontent and force through compromise and conciliatory measures, democratic 
leaders cannot, and face the possibility of electoral defeat following unpopular settlements.64 
This high cost of backing down for democratic politicians leads to more aggressive and inflexible 
policies than proponents of the institutional explanation of the democratic peace contend.65  
Huth and Allee propose that leaders in democratic states pay close attention to the 
audience cost of both using force and retreating or offering concessions.66 Thus, democratic 
states can be expected to be impacted by both provocative and pacifying domestic influences 
when engaged in international territorial disputes. 
Some scholars contend that the pacifying effect of democratic norms and institutions 
extends throughout any conflict involving democratic states, including conflict with non-
democratic regimes.67 These academics argue that democracies show a penchant for peace and 
non-violent conflict resolution throughout their international relations, and that if violence 
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occurs between democratic and non-democratic states, it is the fault of the non-democratic 
state.68 
Other scholars put forth the opinion that the effect of these norms and institutions 
extend only to conflict with other democratic states, and that monadic democracy is insufficient 
to bring about the democratic peace.69 According to this perspective, conflict can actually be 
more likely between democratic and non-democratic states because the feeling of vulnerability 
democratic states face due to their inability to deter timely or credibly due to their high 
domestic audience costs of using force. Since they know their bargaining position is weak 
compared to non-democratic challengers, democracies are likely to be more aggressive to make 
up for it.70 
 
Hypotheses on the Effect of Institutions on Territorial Disputes 
This research will test three hypotheses regarding the dyadic understanding of the 
democratic peace in territorial disputes: 
1. There is a positive relationship between two states in a territorial dispute being 
democracies and the probability the challenger will seek a resolution of a 
territorial dispute through negotiations. 
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2. There is a negative relationship between two states in a territorial dispute being 
democracies and the probability the challenger will escalate to higher levels in a 
militarized dispute. 
3. There is a positive relationship between two states in a territorial dispute being 
democracies and the probability the challenger will offer concessions in the 
negotiation process. 
Three hypotheses regarding the monadic explanation of the democratic peace in 
territorial disputes will also be tested: 
1. There is a positive relationship between a challenger being a democracy and the 
probability the challenger will seek a resolution of a territorial dispute through 
negotiations.  
2. There is a positive relationship between a challenger being a democracy and the 
probability the challenger will escalate to higher levels in a militarized dispute. 
3. There is a positive relationship between a challenger being a democracy and 
probability the challenger will offer concessions in the negotiation process. 
Territorial disputes are often some of the most salient and difficult-to-solve issues in the 
modern world. They involve nationalism, strategic benefits, and economic benefits, so if 
economic interdependence, cultural similarities, or democratic institutional similarities prove to 
have a pacifying effect in resolving them, this will add significant power to the theories of 
economic interdependence, clash of civilizations, and democratic peace having a pacifying 
effect on conflict. 
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Chapter Three: Methods 
 A large n case study was used to test these hypotheses quantitatively with the addition 
of case studies to explore possible causal mechanisms. My analysis of the effects of trade and 
institutions on territorial disputes took advantage of a database of coded territorial disputes 
created by Paul Huth and Todd Allee.71 
Huth and Allee’s database contains data on all territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995. 
The database separates the two countries in a dispute into a challenger state and a target state. 
The challenger state is defined as the state that is attempting to change the territorial status 
quo. The unit of analysis is the challenger state in a specific dispute against a particular target 
state at a certain time. As Huth and Allee put it, “the data is directed-dyadic, but in reference to 
a particular territorial dispute at a particular point in time.”72  
 
Coding Territorial Disputes 
In their territorial dispute data set, Huth and Allee broadly defined disputes as 
“disagreements between governments over (a) the location of existing international boundaries 
in particular spots or along the length of their common border, (b) the refusal of one 
government to recognize another’s claim of sovereign rights over islands, claiming sovereignty 
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for itself instead, or (c) the refusal of one government to recognize another state as a sovereign 
political-territorial unit, laying claim to the territory of that state.”73 
Following this definition, some territorial differences that would be considered by many 
to be territorial disputes were not coded as such by Huth and Allee. The database contains two 
guidelines that are essential to understanding conclusions drawn from its data: First, the only 
territorial disputes considered are those that take place between internationally-recognized 
states. The dispute between Israel and Palestine is therefore not included in the database. 
Conflicts between colonial powers and colonies attempting to become independent are also 
absent, as are disputes between existing states and groups wishing to secede from the 
“homeland territory” of the existing state.74  
Second, only land-based territorial disputes are included in the database.75 This system 
of coding is based on the theory that land-based disputes (including islands) hold substantial 
sway over domestic audiences and foreign policy that is absent in maritime disputes. 76 
Therefore, land-based and maritime disputes should be considered separate in academic 
analysis. However, comparing and contrasting the differences and similarities between the two 
categories could be a very fruitful study for future researchers. 
 
Identifying Claims and Challengers 
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 Territorial disputes center on the idea of governments making territorial claims against 
the territorial claims of another government. Therefore, contradictory border markings by two 
states are insufficient for those states to be coded as having a territorial dispute. The existence 
of a territorial dispute relies on a government making official declarations concerning disputed 
territory. 77  In cases where the legislative and executive branches issued contradictory 
announcements, then the announcement made by the executive was relied upon. If, however, 
a treaty ending a territorial dispute requires signing by the legislature and does not get signed, 
then the dispute is considered unresolved.78 There are also a small number of cases in which 
official declarations and official actions appear disconnected. For example, while Armenia’s 
government denied any territorial claim in Azerbaijan in the 1990s, their substantive support 
for ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan proved otherwise. In these cases, two reliable sources 
revealing the actual government policy were required to consider the claim legitimate.79 
Identifying challengers in territorial disputes can be difficult, especially in cases where 
there is a question of which state’s status quo is being analyzed. In their analysis, Huth and 
Allee relied on the idea of de facto control.80 Thus, whichever state has administrative control 
over the disputed territory is considered to be the target, while the state challenging that 
control is considered the challenger. If one state has effective control over disputed territory, it 
is considered the target in the dispute. If the challenger then successfully takes over the 
disputed territory, but the territory continues to be disputed by what was previously the target 
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country, then a second dispute number is created with the state with de facto control coded as 
the target.81 
In some cases, both states are attempting to change the status quo. In this case, two 
parallel disputes are coded with unique dispute numbers in order to allow analysis of both 
states’ decisions to challenge the status quo or not.82 If in the dual challenger situation both 
states jointly decide to initiate negotiations, then observations of decisions to initiate 
negotiations are coded for both dispute numbers.  
 
Changing the Status Quo 
In examining the challenger’s decision to change the status quo or not, three possible 
courses of actions are considered: (1) do nothing, (2) initiate negotiations, or (3) initiate military 
action. Decisions to initiate negotiations or military actions are coded as occurring on the 
month and year that they occurred, while decisions to do nothing are coded following the “12 
month rule.”83 Under this coding rule, if twelve months have passed since the conclusion of the 
last negotiations or the end of the last military action, then the challenger is assumed to have 
made a decision to do nothing—to not challenge the territorial status quo. This rule continues 
to be applied until a new military action or new talks are initiated. It should be noted that 
multiple rounds of negotiations and multiple military actions can be initiated in a single year. So, 
if a challenger initiates a military dispute and initiates negotiations in the same year, and then 
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resolves the dispute through new negotiations two years later, four observations will be 
entered in the database: the military action, the first negotiation, the decision to do nothing 
twelve months after the end of the first negotiations, and the final negotiations.  
 
 
Creating a Database 
The Huth and Allee territorial dispute data served as the foundation for my final 
database. I collected several variables from their extensive database for my own analysis. Huth 
and Allee’s dispute identification created the framework for my own database, with dispute 
lengths, challengers, and targets all coming from their database. Huth and Allee’s coding for 
changes in the status quo, level of escalation in militarized disputes, and level of concessions in 
negotiations were used as my dependent variable. Several other databases were used to collect 
data for the independent variables. 
 
A Methodology for Economic Analysis 
Trade data was taken from the Correlates of War Project International Trade Dataset 
Version 3.0.84 This database contains dyadic trade data from 1870 to 2009 taken statistics from 
the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics and the Republic of China’s 
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Bureau of Foreign Trade, and Katherine Barbieri’s International Trade Dataset.85 The Correlates 
of War Dataset splits trade between exports from Country A imported by Country B and exports 
from Country B imported by Country A, both flow measures over a given year measured in 2010 
USD.  
Values for exports and imports were added together and divided by challenger GDP to 
create a statistic with total bilateral trade as a percentage of challenger GDP, creating a loose 
measure of the impact of the bilateral trade on the challenger’s economy. National GDP figures 
were taken from the Penn World Tables Version 8.0.86 These figures are purchasing power 
parity-converted and given in 2005 International Dollars.  
 
Trade as Cause or Effect 
 This method for calculating trade as a percent of GDP in a given year contains a serious 
potential flaw in that diminished or increased trade could be the result of decisions to initiate 
negotiations or militarized actions rather than an instigator in the making of the decision. While 
the jump from correlation to causation is a question perhaps best answered through process 
tracing in case studies, quantitative methodology has the potential to at least partially alleviate 
these concerns. 
 In order to test the direction of any possible relationship between trade as a percent of 
GDP and decisions to change the status quo, this research also calculated bilateral trade as a 
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percent of GDP using the year prior to the decision. For example, a decision by Argentina to 
initiate a militarized dispute with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands (called Las 
Malvinas by Argentina) in 1982 was analyzed using the Argentina’s GDP and trade with the 
United Kingdom from 1981 rather than 1982 (.423 percent of GDP rather than 1982’s .125 
percent). Analysis of these data returned the same general results (averages changed slightly, 
but overall significance remained the same) as analysis of same year trade and GDP data, so 
same year data were used in the results section.  
 
A Methodology for Institutional Analysis 
Data on the level of democracy in a country was added to the database using data from 
the Polity IV Project.87 The Polity IV Project contains data on “concomitant qualities of 
democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions” measured along a 21-point scale 
from -10 to 10.88 Countries with scores from 6 to 10 are considered democracies, while 
countries with scores from -5 to 5 are considered anocracies and countries from -10 to -6 are 
considered autocracies. The database also contains scores of -66, -77, and -88 to represent 
interruption periods, interregnum periods, and transition periods respectively.89 
My database used two strategies for analyzing the effect of democracy on territorial 
disputes. The first method uses the given scores and compares them accordingly. The second 
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method divides countries into those that are democracies (countries scoring 6-10 in the Polity 
IV Project) and those that are not (countries scoring -10 to 5). Results were then compared 
across methodologies in order to best understand the patterns and forces at work. 
 
Coding Discrepancies 
In the process of collating data from these sets, several issues had to be dealt with. First, 
figures that were given in terms of different years’ USD had to be changed into the same year. 
To do this, I utilized Oregon State’s Inflation Conversion Factors to inflate all amounts to 2010 
USD.90  
Second, a larger problem presented itself in differing methods of labeling countries. 
Some of these differences were easily solved through changes in spelling or wording, for 
instance changing the name Congo, Brazzaville to the Republic of the Congo and Malagasy to 
Madagascar. Others, however, were more difficult. These generally involved countries that split 
up or unified at some point in the observed time period that were identified by different names 
in different databases. For example, the contrast between the Soviet Union and Russia and East 
and West Germany and Germany. These issues required close examination to determine which 
entity the data referred to. However, there were still several that were ambiguous, such as 
having Yugoslavia in one database and Serbia in another. In such cases, if there was no other 
entry in the database that could be perceived as referring to the country, then the past or 
future name for the country was assumed to be referring to the country. If there were multiple 
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entries on one database that could feasibly be referring to a single entry in another, and it was 
impossible to discern which the correct value was, neither was taken. It should be mentioned 
that this was very rare and only happened around a dozen times for thousands of units of 
analysis. 
Finally, an issue presented itself in how to approach missing values, of which there were 
hundreds. The majority of these units of analysis lacked data for two or more of the figures 
needed to calculate bilateral trade as a percent of challenger GDP, in which case they were left 
empty. Most of these figures were empty for reasons of inadequate reporting or, more 
commonly, no reporting. However, in some cases the reasons are more systematic and 
therefore more troubling. Most worrisome for the purpose of this study is the shortage of data 
on bilateral trade in the case of wars between countries. Since this analysis attempts to 
measure differences in trade and its effect on decisions to change the territorial status quo, it is 
possible findings could be manipulated by this lack of trade data during wars.  
There were also many cases in which only one value was missing. In the case in which 
the missing value was one of the two values trade figures, there were three strategies that 
could be used to attempt to add depth to the database. The first strategy would leave all 
missing values alone, and work only with values found within the databases. The second 
strategy would replace the missing trade value, whether import or export, with a zero, and 
divided that value by challenger GDP to calculate the trade as a percentage of GDP value. The 
third strategy would replace the missing trade value with the existing trade value, in practice 
doubling the existing value, following the logic that trade is likely to be roughly equivalent going 
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in either direction. While all of these strategies have strengths and weaknesses, the first was 
utilized in order to avoid any possible corruption of the data. 
In analyzing the data on level of democracy in a country, an issue arose in how to 
approach the values of -66, -77, and -88. Since they do not represent a level of democracy in 
and of themselves, they had to be either disregarded or converted onto the -10 to 10 scale. The 
Polity IV Project converts these scores by splitting the difference between the scores that come 
before them and those that come after. So, if a country has a polity score of 4 before going into 
a three year-long interruption and returning with a polity score of 8, then the intervening years 
will be recoded from three scores of -66 to scores of 5, 6, and 7. While this method can 
certainly have issues, it allows for a greater level of analysis and gives polity scores to countries 
during crucial times of transformation. However, these scores should not be considered as 
authoritative on an individual level.  
 
A Simpler Methodology for Cultural Analysis 
Analyzing the effect of culture on territorial disputes requires a more basic and more 
imperfect methodology. Thus, in analyzing the effect of culture on territorial disputes, a 
separate, simpler dataset was used. Whereas values of trade and level of democracy are given 
annual measurements, values of culture are not. One of the most well-known and well-
respected measures of culture, the World Values Survey, has only just finished its sixth wave of 
surveys.91 This means that, unlike with trade and institutions, when examining the effect of 
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culture on territorial disputes, this cultural analysis cannot use the challenger state in a specific 
dispute against a particular target state at a certain time as unit of analysis. Since measures of 
culture cannot be broken down into yearly measures, disputes are coded much more simply so 
as to demonstrate the lack of data available on the independent variable.  
For analyzing the culture variable, the unit of analysis is a particular dispute between 
two specific countries. Countries are not distinguished as challenger or target states. Disputes 
between two countries over separate areas are coded as separate disputes unless they were 
treated as a single issue by disputants during negotiations. This dataset for analyzing culture 
used Huth and Allee’s database to identify territorial disputes and to code whether the 
countries at any time throughout the dispute engaged in a militarized action over the disputed 
territory.  
This data set only includes territorial disputes that have taken place from 1950 to 1995, 
leaving out any disputes occurring from 1919 to 1949. This is because the data available for the 
cultural independent variable is only available from 1981 to the present. Even in this short 
period of time, the cultural values of many countries have changed relatively dramatically, so 
the connection between the modern day values survey and pre-Cold War values is strained if 
not broken completely.  
 
Counting Culture 
Data from the World Value Survey was used as the independent variable for cultural 
analysis. The World Value Survey carries out representative national surveys in more than one 
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hundred countries on issues about religious, political, social, and economic life.92 My data set 
utilizes factor analysis of the survey developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel that 
identifies two key dimensions of cultural variance.  
These two dimensions are (1) traditional vs secular-rational values and (2) survival vs 
self-expression values. According to Inglehart and Welzel, these dimensions “explain more than 
70 percent of the cross-cultural variance on scores of more specific values.”93 The traditional vs 
secular-rational dimension contrasts the differences in cultures that emphasize religion, parent-
child ties, and deference to authority and those that do not. The survival vs self-expression 
dimension contrasts the differences between societies focused on physical and economic 
survival and those focused on more subjective well-being, self-expression, and quality of life.94 
In order to analyze the effect of cultural differences and similarities on the likelihood of 
military actions in territorial disputes, first the scores for the two dimensions over the five 
waves of surveys currently available are averaged together for each country. For some 
countries, such as Algeria, there is only one score available while for others, such as the United 
States, there are five that are averaged together. The differences between the two dimensions 
for the two countries are then calculated and added together, coming up with an overall 
“cultural differences” score where a larger score represents a great difference in overall culture 
between the two countries.  
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Weaknesses in the World Value Survey 
This measure undoubtedly contains weaknesses. For instance, the fact that the survey 
measures the religiosity of a culture but not the religion itself overlooks religious differences as 
an impetus for conflict. Furthermore, as the World Values Survey itself shows, values change, 
meaning that giving a single culture values score for a country even from 1950 to 1995 is 
unrealistic.95  
However, given the available data, the World Values Survey data is the best measure 
available. It allows for comprehensive, cross-country cultural comparison in a way that few 
other measures allow. Should any other researcher come up with a better, more descriptive 
method of looking at the effect of cultural differences and similarities on the likelihood of war 
in territorial disputes, it would be a great addition to the literature. A method of measuring 
culture annually would be especially useful for this and other diverse analyses. 
 
McDonaldization of the World 
 In addition to using data from the World Value Survey, this research also uses a 
somewhat tongue-in-cheek measure for culture similarities and differences: the presence of 
McDonald’s in the disputant countries. This methodology flows from such ideas as Thomas 
Friedman’s “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention,” which claimed that two countries 
that have McDonald’s in them will not go to war because “people in McDonald's countries don't 
                                                             
95 Ibid. 
37 
 
like to fight wars; they like to wait in line for burgers.”96 While finally proven wrong in the 2008 
war between Russia and Georgia, the theory nonetheless provides a provocative rubric for 
cultural similarity. This methodology also follows in the footsteps of such well-respected, if 
lighthearted, measures as the Economist’s Big Mac Index, which makes use of the ubiquity of 
McDonald’s worldwide to use its trademark meal, the Big Mac, as a lighthearted gauge of 
purchasing power parity around the world.97 
 This research will use the presence of McDonald’s as a measure of cultural similarity. 
Due to the imprecision inherent in such a measure, a methodology was used that took that 
imprecision into account in making cultural comparisons. This method compared whether 
disputant countries had McDonald’s or whether only one or neither did. Using this method, two 
countries with McDonald’s were considered to be culturally similar, while one country with 
McDonald’s and another without were considered culturally different. Two countries without 
McDonald’s were also coded as culturally different since simple lack of the restaurant does not 
communicate any information about a culture besides its lack of a “McDonald’s culture.” 
 
Weaknesses in McDonald’s as a Cultural Icon 
 This methodology faces similar challenges as those faced by the methodology utilizing 
the World Value Survey. Like the World Value Survey, data on McDonald’s is limited, and the 
company has not been global for long enough to have useful annualized data for the dataset. 
Therefore, this methodology also examines territorial disputes between two specific countries 
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 Thomas L. Friedman, "Foreign Affairs Big Mac I," The New York Times, December 7, 1996. 
97 “The Big Mac Index." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, January 7, 2011. 
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as the unit of analysis like the previous method used for cultural analysis. This method presents 
the same issue of presenting a single, modern picture of countries’ cultures while attempting to 
analyze a half-century of territorial disputes. 
An additional problem with this measure is that it is really a measure of Western 
influence in a country rather than a measure of cultural similarity. A dispute between countries 
like Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, both central Asian countries without McDonald’s, would be 
labelled as culturally different under this methodology due to the measure’s very limited scope. 
However, taken as exactly that, a measure of Western influence, this methodology offers an 
interesting look into how the spread of Western culture affects the culture of conflict resolution 
and territorial disputes.  
 
Chapter Four: Results 
 A combination of t-tests, difference of means tests, and crosstabulations were used to 
analyze the data. Analysis generally supported the hypotheses about the effect of trade and 
institutions on territorial disputes, while the hypotheses predicting the effect of similarities and 
differences in culture were summarily refuted.  
 
 
 
General Results 
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 There were a total of 6542 observations of decisions to uphold the status quo, initiate 
negotiations, or initiate a militarized action within 348 territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995. 
Of those observations, 67 percent were decisions to uphold the status quo, 27 percent were 
decisions to initiate negotiations, and 6 percent were decisions to initiate militarized action.  
In examining decisions by challengers engaged in negotiations to offer no concessions, 
limited concessions, or major concession, there were 1528 observations, of which 63 percent 
were decisions to offer no concession, 30 percent were decisions to offer limited concessions, 
and 7 percent were decisions to offer major concessions. 
In examining decisions by challengers engaged in militarized disputes to follow low 
escalation, moderate escalation, or major escalation, there were 374 observations, of which 22 
percent were low escalation, 54 percent were moderate escalation, and 24 percent were major 
escalation. 
 
Economic Interdependence in the Decision to Change the Status Quo 
There were 2910 observations to continue or change the status quo that had complete 
bilateral trade and challenger GDP data for the time period extending from 1950 to 1995. The 
average for trade as a percent of challenger GDP throughout this time period was 1.65 percent, 
with a minimum of 0 percent and a maximum of 36.63 percent. 
At this stage of the territorial dispute, the expected correlation existed between 
economic interdependence and a challenger’s decisions to follow neutral, peaceful, or violent 
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methods of resolution. Bilateral trade between disputant countries as a percentage of 
challenger GDP was, as hypothesized, significantly different when countries decided to continue 
the status quo, initiate negotiations, or initiate militarized action, with averages of 1.62 percent, 
2.00 percent, and 0.37 percent respectively (F=12.46, η2=.01, p<.01).98 Bilateral trade as a 
percentage of GDP was found to be higher when countries made the decision to initiate 
negotiations than when countries decided to uphold the status quo (t=-2.01, df=1274.504, 
p<.05).99 Trade over GDP was also statistically higher when countries decided to continue the 
status quo than when they decided to initiate militarized action (t=-2.01, df=615.176, p<.01). 
Trade over GDP was also found to be significantly higher when countries decided to initiate 
negotiations than when they decided to initiate militarized action (t=8.47, df=1013.676, p<.01).  
 
Economic Interdependence in the Decision of How Much to Escalate 
 There were 174 observations of decisions to escalate to various levels that had 
complete bilateral trade and challenger GDP data for the time period extending from 1950 to 
1995. The average for trade as a percent of challenger GDP for these observations was 0.37 
percent, with a minimum of 0 percent and a maximum of 9.89 percent. 
In a challenger’s decision on how much to escalate in a militarized dispute, economic 
interdependence again followed the expected pattern with challengers with less trade as a 
                                                             
98 The results from the one-year-lagged trade and GDP statistics had means of 1.60 percent, 1.93 percent, and 0.33 
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percentage of GDP more likely to escalate more. Trade over GDP was significantly different 
when countries decided to escalate to low, moderate, or major levels, with averages of 0.74 
percent, 0.28 percent, and 0.09 percent respectively (F=3.16, η2=.04, p<.05). However, when 
compared side-by-side through t-tests, only the difference between the decision to escalate to 
low levels and the decision to escalate to major levels was statistically significant (t=2.32, 
df=45.35, p<.05). The difference between decisions to escalate to low or moderate levels was 
not significant (t=1.57, df=54.55, p>.10), and the difference between decisions to escalate to 
moderate or major levels was also not significant (t=1.02, df=127, p>.10). 
 
Economic Interdependence in the Decision to Offer Concessions 
There were 757 observations of decisions to offer concessions that had complete 
bilateral trade and challenger GDP data for the time period extending from 1950 to 1995. The 
average for trade as a percent of challenger GDP for these observations was 2.18 percent, with 
a minimum of 0 percent and a maximum of 36.63 percent. 
The decision by challengers to offer different levels of concessions does correlate 
significantly with the level of trade over GDP of challenger, but in the opposite direction than 
expected. Rather than higher trade over GDP leading to major concessions, lower trade over 
GDP led to major concessions. Trade over GDP of challenger was significantly different when 
countries decided to offer no, limited, or major concessions, with averages of 2.15 percent, 
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2.59 percent, and 0.43 percent respectively (F=2.78, η2=.01, p<.10).100 The difference in Trade 
over GDP between decisions to offer no concessions and offer limited concessions is statistically 
nonexistent (t=-0.97, df=716, p>.10). The difference between the decision to offer no 
concessions and the decision to offer major concessions is significant (t=6.83, df=375.25, p<.01), 
as is the difference between the decision to offer limited concessions and the decision to offer 
major concessions (t=4.67, df=218.81, p<.01). 
 
The Democratic Peace in the Decision to Change the Status Quo 
 There were 6542 observations of decisions to uphold the status quo, initiate 
negotiations, or initiate militarized action that had complete Polity IV scores for 348 territorial 
disputes from 1919 to 1995. Of these observations, 23 percent of challengers were democratic 
(Polity IV score≥6), while 77 percent were non-democratic (Polity IV score<6). Meanwhile, 11 
percent of disputant dyads in these observations were both democratic, 43 percent were both 
non-democratic, and 45 percent had one democratic and one non-democratic disputant. 
 In these observations, there was a statistically significant correlation between a 
challenger being democratic and that challenger initiating negotiations and negative correlation 
between the challenger being democratic and initiating militarized action (Cramer’s V=.09, 
p<.01) with a 9.4 percent greater chance of initiating negotiations than non-democratic 
challengers and a 2.4 percent smaller chance of initiating militarized action than non-
democratic challengers.  
                                                             
100 Note that here p=.06 and is therefore only significant at a 90% level. 
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 There is also a statistically significant difference in decisions between democratic 
disputant dyads and non-democratic and mixed dyads (Cramer’s V=.08, p<.01). Challengers in 
democratic dyads were 9.8 percent more likely to initiate negotiations than challengers in non-
democratic and mixed dyads. Challengers in democratic dyads were also 3.7 percent less likely 
to initiate militarized action than challengers in non-democratic and mixed dyads.  
 
The Democratic Peace in the Decision of How Much to Escalate 
There were 374 observations of decisions of how much to escalate that had complete 
Polity IV scores for disputes from 1919 to 1995. Of these observations, 15 percent of 
challengers were democratic and 85 percent were non-democratic. Meanwhile, 4 percent of 
disputant dyads in these observations were both democratic, 53 percent were both non-
democratic, and 43 percent had one democratic and one non-democratic disputant. 
 In these observations, there was no statistically significant difference between a 
challenger being democratic and that challenger escalating to different levels in militarized 
disputes (p>.10).  
 However, there is a statistically significant difference in decisions of how much to 
escalate between democratic disputant dyads and non-democratic and mixed dyads (Cramer’s 
V=.15, p<.05). Challengers in democratic dyads were 24.9 percent less likely to escalate to 
major levels than challengers in non-democratic and mixed dyads. Challengers in democratic 
dyads were 35.0 percent more likely to escalate moderately and 10.1 percent less likely to 
pursue limited escalation as compared to challengers in non-democratic and mixed dyads.  
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The Democratic Peace in the Decision to Offer Concessions 
There were 1528 observations of decisions of challengers in negotiations of whether to 
offer concessions and how much to offer that had complete Polity IV scores for disputes from 
1919 to 1995. Of these observations, 29 percent of challengers were democratic and 71 percent 
were non-democratic. Meanwhile, 15 percent of disputant dyads in these observations were 
both democratic, 37 percent were both non-democratic, and 48 percent had one democratic 
and one non-democratic disputant. 
There was no statistically significant difference between a challenger being democratic 
and that challenger offering no, limited, or major concessions in negotiations (p>.10).101 There 
was also no statistical difference in level of concessions offered by the challenger in 
negotiations between democratic disputant dyads and non-democratic or mixed disputant 
dyads (p>.10). 
 
 
Cultural Similarities and Differences in Dispute Resolution 
 There were 179 observations of territorial disputes from 1950-1995 in the simplified 
database. Of those, 70 include a decision by ether the challenger or the target to initiate a 
militarized action at some point within the time period. 
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for democratic and non-democratic challengers. 
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World Values Survey and Territorial Disputes 
 Of the 179 observations of territorial disputes, 84 contained complete data for both 
disputant countries in at least one iteration of the World Values Survey. Of the examined 
population, 32 contained militarized action as some point and 52 did not. 
 There was no statistically significant difference in the differences between disputant 
countries’ cultural values for territorial disputes in which a militarized dispute had taken place 
and those in which it had not (t=1.09, df=82, p>.10). The difference in traditional/secular 
rational scores of disputants was also statistically insignificant between territorial disputes with 
militarized actions and those without (t=0.88, df=82, p>.10). Similarly, the difference in 
survival/self-expression scores of disputants was statistically insignificant (t=0.73, df=82, p>.10). 
 
McDonald’s, War, and Peace 
 All 179 observations of territorial disputes have data on whether they have McDonald’s 
in them. In the 179 observations, 87 of disputant dyads currently have McDonald’s in both 
countries while 92 dyads have McDonald’s in only one or neither disputant.  
 Territorial disputes involving countries that both currently have McDonald’s are exactly 
as likely to involve militarized action as disputes involving one or no country with McDonald’s, 
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with 39.1 percent of disputes in both categories involving militarized action and 60.9 percent 
not (p=.995).102 
 
Chapter Five: Discussion 
The results seen above show the difficulty in finding a single cause in a country’s 
decision to initiate negotiations or a militarized dispute, as well as a country’s decision to offer 
concessions or escalate a militarized dispute. While both dyadic democratic institutions and 
higher levels of trade were shown to correlate positively with a country’s decision to negotiate, 
the power of these relationships are relatively weak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Overview of Results of Effect of Economic Interdependence, Institutions, and 
Culture on Dependent Variables103 
 
                                                             
102 Differences in the number of people per McDonald’s in disputant countries was also analyzed, but was also 
statistically insignificant (t=-1.47, df=81, p>.10). 
103
 Chart shows existence of statistically significant relationships (*= significant at .05 level, †=significant at .01 level, 
and ‡=significant at .10 level). It should be noted that statistical correlation here should not be confused with 
causation. While greater amounts of bilateral trade is shown here to correlate with less escalation in militarized 
disputes, deeper analysis is necessary to show the former led to the latter.  
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
  
Decision to 
challenge status 
quo 
Decision to 
escalate military 
action 
Decision to offer 
concessions 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Economic 
Integration 
More bilateral 
trade→ more 
negotiations, 
fewer militarized 
disputes† 
More bilateral 
trade→ less 
escalation in 
militarized 
disputes* 
More bilateral 
trade→ fewer 
concessions 
offered‡ 
Monadic 
Institutions 
Democratic 
challenger→ more 
negotiations, 
fewer militarized 
disputes† 
No Significant 
Results 
No Significant 
Results 
Dyadic 
Institutions 
Democratic 
dyad→ more 
negotiations, 
fewer militarized 
disputes† 
Democratic 
dyad→ less 
escalation in 
militarized 
disputes* 
No Significant 
Results 
Cultural 
Similarities 
No Significant Results 
 
Economic Interdependence in Territorial Disputes 
 In the decision to change the status quo, the results followed the expected pattern in 
more trade leading to fewer militarized disputes and more negotiations. This finding agrees 
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with the theory of economic interdependence, suggesting that increased trade can lead to less 
militarized conflict.104 This direction of this finding is strengthened by the fact that, even when 
trade and GDP figures are lagged a year, the correlation still exists. This helps to disprove the 
possibility that the causation acts in the opposite direction, with militarized action causing 
decreased trade and the announcement of negotiations causing increased trade. 
 In the decision of how much to escalate, the results again agree with the theory of 
economic interdependence, with more trade correlated with less escalation. It should be noted 
that trade made no difference in a challenger’s decision to escalate to low or to moderate 
levels. This pattern is partially explained by the real world finding that in some cases, 
challengers escalate to low or medium levels with the hope of achieving territorial objectives 
without the bilateral relationship being unduly damaged.105 
 There are several causal mechanisms at work that cause increased trade to lead to less 
violent solutions. In general, trade increases the opportunity costs of militarized disputes, 
making it more expensive to fight due to the potential lost trade.106 In domestic politics, trade 
can also create powerful businesses that have a stake in continued healthy relations with the 
target country.107 Finally, trade can also create more opportunities for people-to-people 
                                                             
104 Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.” 
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107 Souva and Prins, “The Liberal Peace Revisited,” 184-5. 
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contact between disputant countries, theoretically making them less willing to go to war.108 
These causal mechanisms will be explored further in the next chapter of case studies. 
 Results on the effect of trade on the decision to offer concession in negotiations is much 
more counterintuitive. The theory of economic interdependence would hypothesize that more 
trade would lead to more concessions, but in practice the opposite is true. Higher levels of 
bilateral trade as a percentage of challenger GDP are correlated with fewer concessions. 
There are several possible causal mechanisms at work to lead to this finding. It is 
possible that the business actors in favor of peaceful relations are able to influence the 
challenger government enough to make it initiate negotiations, but that when faced with the 
prospect of concessions, the general public outcry against it would be too much for the 
challenger to justify. However, while this explanation would explain a lack of any statistically 
significant data, it does not explain the results saying that trade leads to fewer concessions. 
Another possible explanation could support the theory that economic interdependence leads to 
economic dependence, so while a challenger with high levels of trade wants to negotiate, it can 
use those high levels of trade to get concessions from the target country.109  
If the writer had more time, he would have explored this surprising finding in greater 
depth. As it is, it serves as a fascinating result that undoubtedly deserves closer attention in the 
future whether from this or other researchers. 
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 The data do not support this theory, with no significant difference in trade as a percentage of target GDP 
between different levels of concessions by targets. (t=-.232, df=611, p=.82) 
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Institutions in Territorial Disputes 
The results for the effect of monadic and dyadic democratic institutions followed the 
expected pattern in both cases, with both monadic and dyadic democracies less likely to initiate 
a militarized dispute and more likely to initiate negotiations and dyadic democracies less likely 
to escalate as much as non-democratic and mixed dyads. This finding supports both the 
monadic and dyadic theories of the democratic peace, though the monadic theory of 
democratic peace is only supported in the decisions to change the status quo. Neither theories 
are supported in the decision to offer concessions.  
There are several mechanisms through which monadic and dyadic democracy could 
work to make militarized action less likely and negotiations more likely. Democratic institutions 
(either monadic or dyadic) could lead to more peaceful resolution processes due to norms for 
non-violent conflict resolution derived from domestic political practices. Democratic institutions 
could also create incentives against the use of force for political leaders in democracies who 
face a high possibility of domestic opposition to decisions to use force, especially is it is 
unsuccessful or leads to large loss of life.110 While both explanations could work through 
monadic and dyadic democratic institutions, the power of democratic norms is likely stronger in 
democratic dyads, where democratic challengers lack the righteous moral high ground present 
in militarized conflict with non-democratic regimes. This dichotomy helps explain the weaker 
explanatory power of monadic democratic institutions in decisions of how much to escalate 
compared with the statistically significant effect of dyadic democratic institutions.  
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 Huth and Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict, 12; Bueno De Mesquita and Lalman, War and 
Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives, Chapter 5; Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes 
of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986," 624-38. 
51 
 
Neither monadic nor dyadic democratic institutions had a significant impact on a 
challenger’s decision to offer concessions. It is possible that in this case, the effect of domestic 
audience costs overpowers any pacifying effect of democratic norms and institutions and 
makes leaders less willing to offer concession in territorial disputes.111 While domestic 
audiences are generally against militarized disputes and supportive of non-violent conflict 
resolution, they are also against retreating or offering concessions. These causal mechanisms 
will be explored in greater depth through case studies in the next chapter. 
 
Culture in Territorial Disputes 
 The results of the effect of culture on the militarization of territorial disputes revealed 
no statistically significant relationships, going against the hypothesized results. Further research 
is required to explore the reasons behind these results. It is possible that the results simply 
demonstrate the fact that similar cultures are likely to be geographically close to each other, 
where territorial disputes are most likely to occur. The results could imply that culture simply 
has little effect on the choice to use force in territorial disputes, and that Alexander Wendt and 
constructivism, in this situation at least, do not represent the actual international order.  
However, it is likely that the main reason for these results lies in the inadequate 
measures used in comparing countries’ culture. Not only did the methodology used assume 
static cultural values for countries over a period of forty-five years, it also used measures that, 
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52 
 
while useful in comparing across cultures, failed to encompass some of the most contentious 
aspects of cultural differences such as different religions.  
 
Chapter Six: Case Studies 
I will examine three case studies in an attempt to explore the causal mechanisms behind 
the quantitative results discussed above. These cases are China and India’s territorial dispute 
over the eastern and western sections of their border, China, the Republic of China (hereinafter 
referred to as Taiwan), and Japan’s dispute over the Senkaku Islands (referred to as the Diaoyu 
Islands by China and Taiwan—hereinafter referred to as the Senkaku Islands), and Japan and 
South Korea’s dispute over the Liancourt Rocks (referred to as Takeshima by the Japanese and 
as Dokdo by South Korea—hereinafter referred to as the Liancourt Rocks).  
I will use these three disputes as case studies for several reasons. First, they contain 
ample variation across cases, making them good choices for comparison.112 Moreover, the 
disputes are relatively data-rich, with extensive scholarly research and supporting documents 
available to add depth to the case study, making it a strong candidate for selection.113 Finally, 
the cases are intrinsically important, with all three disputes still serving as contentious elements 
in the countries’ bilateral relationships, so further analysis can help add understanding to the 
important issues.114 
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These cases have varying results in the dependent and independent variables, making 
closer analysis ideal. The case of India and China is a case with little bilateral trade, no 
democratic challenger, militarized action, and high levels of escalation. Meanwhile, the Senkaku 
Islands dispute includes high levels of trade, one mixed dyad and one democratic dyad, one 
non-democratic and one democratic challenger, no militarized disputes, and negotiations with 
moderate concessions.115 Finally, the dispute over the Liancourt Rocks changes across time in 
terms of trade and institutions, initially with a non-democratic challenger, mixed dyad, little 
trade, and militarized action and later with a democratic dyad, high trade, no militarized action, 
and negotiations.  
These cases are also data-rich, with prolific, in-depth research available on the Sino-
Indian dispute and the Senkaku Islands dispute in particular. While internal documents form the 
Chinese government are difficult to obtain, there is nonetheless abundant analysis available of 
Chinese government thinking in the disputes.  
All three of these cases continue to serve as headaches to leaders in disputant countries 
who wish to improve bilateral relations, so these disputes are especially good targets for 
further analysis. The Senkaku Islands dispute has poisoned Sino-Japanese relations (and to a 
lesser extent, Taiwanese-Japanese relations) while the Liancourt Rocks dispute has done the 
same to the Korean-Japanese relationship. While the Sino-Indian dispute is less contentious at 
the moment, it remains unresolved and risks damaging the two countries’ relationship.  
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China and India Territorial Dispute 
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Figure 6.1: Map of Disputed Area of Sino-Indian Border116 
The Sino-Indian territorial dispute focuses on three areas of the Chinese border with 
India: the eastern sector extending from Bhutan to Myanmar and including much of the current 
Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, the central sector extending from Nepal to Jammu and 
Kashmir, and the western sector extending along the border of Indian-controlled Jammu and 
Kashmir and including the region of Aksai Chin. According to India, the border of the central and 
eastern sectors follows the McMahon Line, which was agreed to through a treaty between 
British India and Qing China, while the western sector, including parts of Pakistani-controlled 
Kashmir, follows the Johnson Line formed through a similar agreement. China, meanwhile, 
argues that treaties signed by Qing China were signed under principles of inequality, and 
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therefore refuses to follow them.117 However, China has agreed in principle to follow the 
border as defined by the McMahon Line, though Beijing disputes the area of Aksai Chin in the 
western sector, supporting the more southerly MacDonald Line due to a strategic road running 
through the sector linking the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.118  
 In the beginning years of the dispute between China and the newly independent India, 
China is considered the challenger, with India becoming the challenger after the end of the 
1962 border war. However, in several important aspects of the dispute, India could also be 
fruitfully considered a challenger, and will be analyzed as such for purpose of the case study. 
This analysis will focus on India’s decision to implement an aggressive forward policy and not 
offer concessions in dispute negotiations and China’s decision to initiate military action against 
India in the lead up to the 1962 war. 
 
India’s Approach to the Sino-Indian Border 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Communist takeover of China, Sino-Indian relations 
were initially characterized by calls for friendship and cooperation and shouts of “Hindi, Chini, 
Bhai Bhai!” (Indians, Chinese, Brothers!).119 However, as China experienced an uprising in Tibet 
in 1959 supported by much of the Indian population and as the underlying differences in 
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interpretations of the border became apparent, Sino-Indian relations began to worsen 
significantly.120 
 While the Indian government was committed to a position of neutrality in international 
affairs, President Jawaharlal Nehru found this a difficult position to keep in response to the 
Tibetan uprising and resulting Chinese crackdown of 1959.121 Indian public sentiment was 
intensely pro-Tibetan and anti-Chinese, with deep cultural and feudal connections with the 
Tibetan groups across the border.122 In January 1962, the Indian paper Statesman even 
proposed that “the support for the Dalai Lama and for the Tibetan refugees be made part of 
Indian policy toward China”123 In this case, cultural similarities at a local level helped lead to 
greater conflict in the national bilateral relationship. At the same time, Nehru’s need to garner 
public support in democratic India helped lead to a more confrontational policy with 
communist China. In an interview with the BBC on March 12, 1962, Nehru said that the Dalai 
Lama had been a significant factor in the Sino-Indian border dispute and criticized China, saying 
that “[China] has done a lot of harm to Tibet and its people.”124  
 These factors helped contribute to India’s forward policy in the territorial dispute, in 
which India established new military posts and border patrols in the disputed territory in the 
eastern and western sectors.125 China’s internal instability at the time also convinced New Delhi 
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to implement this forceful policy. As one of Nehru’s close advisors later recalled, “Nehru 
believed… if we dealt with [the Chinese] strongly we should have the better of them…. Nehru 
felt that… the Chinese were in no position to divert their attention to anything except putting 
their internal matters right.”126 As Nehru himself saw it, China and India were engaged in “a 
game of military chess with each side maneuvering for position.”127 There was a strong 
conviction among policymakers in New Delhi that this chess match would not devolve into 
war.128 
It was in this context that Nehru refused Chinese offers in negotiations. Sino-Indian 
trade was minimal, only .03 percent of Indian GDP in 1960, creating few opportunities for 
exchange and fewer players in domestic politics with stakes in peaceful Sino-Indian relations. 
Cultural differences on the national level were amplified by cultural similarities on the 
provincial level, creating public sentiment against China. As a democratic country, India could 
not easily overcome nationalist, anti-Chinese sentiment in its population, making concessions 
more difficult to support. For all of these reasons, New Delhi implemented an aggressive 
forward policy, failed to reach agreement in negotiations with Beijing, and put the country on a 
path toward war. 
 
China’s Approach to the Sino-Indian Border 
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 In the beginning of the 1960’s, China “considered the United States its primary enemy 
abroad and urgently needed to devote its efforts to long-term economic construction at 
home.”129 While Beijing was disturbed by India’s support for the Tibetan rebels and granting of 
asylum to the Dalai Lama, Chinese leaders were most concerned about the dire state of the 
economy following the disastrous Great Leap Forward.130 In this context, Zhou Enlai traveled to 
India in April 1960 following the successful resolution of boundary disputes with Burma and 
Nepal with the hope of peacefully negotiating an end to the Sino-Indian border dispute.131  
 In a meeting in April 1960, Zhou offered concessions to Nehru through which China 
would relinquish claims in the eastern sector in return for India giving up claims to the Aksai 
China area in the western sector.132 The negotiations were unsuccessful, and though a similar 
offer remained on the table for the next two years, it continued to be ill-received by India. In 
1962, Beijing began to get increasingly concerned over India’s forward policy, noting that “if 
India continues to invade and occupy China’s territory and expand the area of its intrusion and 
harassment on China’s border, the Chinese government will be compelled to consider the 
further step of resuming border patrols along the entire Sino-Indian border.”133 
 Nonetheless, economic concerns continued to play a pivotal role in decision making in 
Beijing. However, “Chinese leadership continued to pursue a policy of self-reliance, which had 
been the standard of economic development since 1958.”134 Even in this environment of 
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economic self-reliance, Beijing preferred diplomacy and trade to military actions. Just four 
months before hostilities broke out in October 1962, Chinese leaders were endeavoring to 
renew the Sino-Indian Treaty of Trade and Intercourse, which expired on June 3 despite 
Beijing’s efforts.135 China attempted to resolve the dispute through diplomacy once more in July 
and August, but when negotiations collapsed on August 22, 1962, the “militant line gained 
ascendance over the line of diplomatic reconciliation.”136 The path from this point to the 
decision to initiate military action was a short one, with war breaking out in October 1962. 
 In 1959, China showed every intention to resolve the Sino-Indian boundary dispute 
through peaceful negotiations. Even with bilateral trade at the miniscule level of .06 percent of 
Chinese GDP, Beijing nonetheless attempted to resolve the dispute peacefully in order to focus 
on trade and domestic economic development. However, as a non-democratic regime with 
massive internal instability, China’s threats to use force in response to Indian maneuvering 
were not believed in New Delhi, where the credibility of such threats would have been 
strengthened by democratic audience costs. With negotiations unsuccessful, Beijing found 
military action to be its only choice. 
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China, Taiwan, and Japan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
 
Figure 6.2: Map of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Surrounding Area137 
 The Senkaku Islands dispute centers around eight uninhabited islands in the East China 
Sea. While uninhabited, the waters around the islands serve as rich fishing grounds and are 
located over an area thought to be rich in oil and gas reserves.  
The islands were originally recognized as part of the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was 
incorporated into Japan in 1879 as part of the Okinawa prefecture.138 Japan claims that it 
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surveyed the islands in the 19th century and, finding them uninhabited, claimed them as part of 
Japan in January 1895.139  
Both China and Taiwan dispute Japanese ownership of the islands, saying that the 
Ryukyu Kingdom was a tributary state of the Qing Dynasty before its incorporation into 
Japan.140 According to their version of the dispute, the Senkaku Islands only became part of 
Japan in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the Sino-Japanese war under which 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan, which would include it in the territory returned to their previous 
owners in the Treaty of San Francisco.141 
Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which officially ended World War II and returned 
control of most of the territory seized by the Japanese Empire, the Senkaku Islands were placed 
under U.S. administration along with Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. The United States 
“returned” the islands to Japan in 1971 through the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, at which 
point Beijing and Taipei lodged complaints against the move, claiming ownership to the 
Senkaku Islands and the waters around them.142 
In analyzing this dispute, both China and Taiwan will both be considered challengers 
with Japan as the target.143 This analysis will focus on China’s decision to continue the status 
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quo, initiate negotiations, and not initiate militarized action and Taiwan’s decision to do the 
same, examining the parallel and diverging motives behind both governments’ rationales. 
 
China and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
 China first challenged Japanese control over the Senkaku Islands in 1970, but the 
dispute was not a serious impediment to Sino-Japanese relations for the first decades of its 
existence. The main impetuses behind Beijing’s initial 1970 claim were, first, the discovery of 
large oil and gas reserves underneath the islands and, second, the hope that, through its 
protest, the United States might not return the islands to Japan in the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty.144 
 When China and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1973, the issue of the 
disputed islands was discussed, and the two governments agreed to shelve the dispute in order 
to support a present normalization of relations.145 When then-Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping 
visited Japan in October 1978 to sign the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, he said 
about the dispute that: 
It is true that two sides maintain different views on this question…. It does not 
matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is 
not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation 
will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all.146 
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At the time of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, three pressures served to 
restrain any possible Chinese military action over the Senkaku Islands. First, Beijing sought allies 
to balance against its chief adversary, Moscow, and Japan played an important role in 
containing Soviet hegemony.147 Second, Japan’s alliance with the United States, which includes 
defense of areas under Japanese administration, including the Senkaku Islands, made military 
action in the Senkaku Islands tied to possible confrontation with the United States.148 Finally, 
Japan served as an essential trade partner and supplier of foreign direct investment and 
technology, drastically increasing the potential costs of military action.149  
 The importance of Japan as a trading partner has remained an essential dimension of 
their bilateral relations throughout the past decades. While Japan’s alliance with the United 
States continues to act as a deterrent against any possible Chinese military action, Sino-
Japanese economic interdependence has “[acted] as a constraint against allowing relations to 
deteriorate unduly.”150 However, while the U.S. alliance and economic interdependence serve 
as deterrents against Chinese aggression, the weight of Japan’s militarist past and the 
differences in their modern day values and political systems bring conflict into the 
relationship.151 While economic interdependence has led to improved Sino-Japanese relations 
and has helped avoid a militarized dispute over the Senkaku Islands, “there is no corresponding 
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spillover into social, intellectual, or security engagement.”152 The possibility for militarized 
action in the territorial dispute, while muted by economic interdependence, remains. 
 It should be mentioned that militarized action over disputed offshore islands are by no 
means anathema to Beijing, with past military action over the disputed islands of the South 
China Seas serving as a prime example. In 1974 and 1988 China clashed with first the Republic 
of Vietnam and then the Democratic Republic of Vietnam over the Crescent Group and the 
Spratly Islands respectively.153 As late as 2012, China used coercive tactics (though not outright 
military action) to wrestle control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines.154 It is 
therefore notable that China has not chosen to pursue a similar strategy in the East China Sea. 
 In the late 1970s Beijing pursued negotiations with Japan in the form of joint 
development of the surrounding oil and gas fields.155 While the idea of joint development 
ultimately proved unsuccessful, it illustrates China’s deference toward economic interests in its 
relationship with Japan. From the pursuit of joint development until the renewal of conflict 
over the islands in 2012, Beijing was consistent in pursuing a nonviolent policy, withholding 
support from Hong Kong and Taiwanese activists attempting to plant flags on the islands and 
constraining anti-Japanese protests over the dispute in Beijing.156 As recently as April 2007, a 
joint communique between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao stated that “the two sides [would] conduct joint development in accordance with the 
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principle of mutual benefit as a temporary arrangement pending the completion of 
demarcation of sea borders.”157 
 China’s attitude toward Japan and the dispute has deteriorated significantly throughout 
the early 21st century, with the bilateral relationship reaching a low point in September 2012, 
when the Japanese government bought three of the islands from a private owner.158 While 
Tokyo purportedly bought the islands in order to stop a nationalist mayor from purchasing 
them, Beijing saw the purchase as a move by Japan to strengthen its control over the disputed 
islands.159 Since 2012, China has continued to take a more aggressive stance toward the islands, 
allowing larger anti-Japanese protests following the purchase, increasing naval and air patrols 
over the area, and establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone above the islands.160 While 
the mutual benefits gained by both China and Japan from their economic relationship continues 
to act as ballast in Sino-Japanese relations, moderating and tempering possible conflict, the 
prospect of militarized action over the Senkaku Islands remains strong due to an overall failure 
of the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship to extend beyond economics.161 
 
 
Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute 
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 Like China, Taiwan first challenged Japanese ownership of the Senkaku Islands in 1970, 
shortly before they were returned to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Taipei’s 
decision to contest the islands’ ownership was driven by the discovery of oil and gas reserves 
around the islands, the use of the waters surrounding the islands as a rich fishing area, and the 
hope that the United States would refrain from returning the islands to Japanese control under 
the upcoming treaty.162  
 Following the return of the islands to Japanese administration, Taiwan refrained from 
initiating military action against Japan for two main reasons. First and most importantly, Taiwan 
relied (and continues to rely) on military support from the United States to defend itself against 
China, so possible militarized actions against the U.S. treaty ally of Japan would be significantly 
constrained. Second, Taiwan and Japan are economically interdependent, with significant 
bilateral trade and foreign direct investment.  
 Throughout the following decades, these twin forces continued to push Taiwan away 
from militarized action and toward negotiations. Taiwanese activists and fishermen supported 
more nationalistic policies, attempting to plant flags on the disputed islands and traveling in 
mass to the disputed waters to protest Japan’s ownership.163 Nonetheless, Taiwan continued to 
uphold the status quo while pushing for a fishing agreement. During this time, as Taiwan 
democratized, Japanese sympathy for the island increased, improving bilateral relations.164 
While Taiwanese fishermen continued to assert their rights to fish in the waters around the 
islands, shared democratic institutions and norms for peaceful conflict resolution helped 
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prevent the dispute from extending beyond a water-cannon battle between Japanese Coast 
Guard vessels and Taiwanese fishing boats.165 Negotiations between the two governments 
culminated in a fishing agreement in April 2013 that allowed Taiwanese fishermen access to the 
majority of the Japanese-controlled waters surrounding the islands.166  
 In the future of the Taiwanese-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands, these factors 
of economic interdependence, shared democratic institutions, and shared alliance partner are 
very likely to help avoid militarized action over the islands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan and South Korea and the Dispute over the Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo/Takeshima 
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Figure 6.2: Map of Liancourt Rocks/Dokdo/Takeshima and Surrounding Area167 
The dispute over the Liancourt Rocks centers around two small islets and their surround 
rocks in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The islands are currently administered by South Korea and 
are inhabited by a civilian fisherman and his wife as well as a small detachment of the South 
Korean Coast Guard.168 The waters around the islands are rich fishing grounds and are thought 
to have gas preserves underneath them, though the amount is unknown. 
In analyzing this dispute, South Korea is considered the challenger with Japan as the 
target. This analysis will focus on Seoul’s decision to initiate militarized action against Japan in 
the early 1950’s, and then to continue the status quo and initiate negotiations from 1960 to the 
present. 
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South Korea and the Liancourt Rocks Dispute 
The modern dispute over the Liancourt Rocks emerged as an issue following the end of 
World War II, when, with the implementation of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1952, the islets 
were about to be reverted to Japanese sovereignty.169 While the Korean War was still in 
progress and before the Treaty of San Francisco came into effect, President Syngman Rhee of 
South Korea proclaimed jurisdiction over a wide swathe of waters between Korea and Japan 
including the Liancourt Rocks. Rhee argued that the islands, which were first incorporated 
under Japanese control in 1905 under the principle of terra nullius, were historically part of 
Korea, and Tokyo’s administration of the Liancourt Rocks was just another example of Japan’s 
imperial, militarist legacy.170 Under the South Korean interpretation of the Treaty of San 
Francisco and declarations by the occupation forces in Japan, the Liancourt Rocks were part of 
the territory renounced by Japan as its “former imperial possessions.”171 
In 1953, the South Korean government under President Syngman Rhee decided to 
initiate militarized action in order to take control of the islets. On July 12, 1953, fifteen days 
before the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, ending the Korean War, “armed Korean 
officials” fired on a Japanese patrol boat that was ordering Korean fishermen to leave the 
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islets.172 In August, 1954, another Japanese patrol boat was fired upon by South Korean military 
personnel on the islands.173 
Official decision-making behind this initiation of militarized action is difficult to 
determine, but was likely instigated by and sustained by three key facts. First, South Korea 
retained harsh feelings for its former colonial master. When the idea of having Japanese troops 
help fight North Korea was entertained in 1951, Syngman Rhee responded by saying that if that 
happened “he would conclude a truce with the North Korean Communists to repel the 
Japanese.”174  Second, trade between South Korea and Japan was minimal, adding little 
incentive for peaceful settlement. While total bilateral trade equaled the relatively high 2.1% 
and 1.4% of South Korea GDP in 1953 and 1954 respectively, this trade was a consequence U.S. 
spending for the Korean War rather than a reflection of economic interdependence.175 Third, 
South Korea was not a democracy, and had no norm for peaceful conflict resolution nor need to 
respond to popular sentiment, as epitomized by the Korean War.  
The most surprising fact behind the militarized actions initiated by Seoul in 1953 and 
1954 is that it occurred despite the immense U.S. presence in both countries. It also occurred 
while Japanese minesweepers crewed by Japanese seamen were being used (admittedly 
without the knowledge of the South Korean government) to fight the North Koreans.176 This 
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fact supports the finding in the above section on the Taiwanese-Japanese dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands that even with Taiwan’s existential reliance on the United States, the possibility 
of military action remained, and was not initiated for additional reasons beyond a shared 
alliance partner. 
Following this military action carried out by South Korea against Japan, a period of 
continuation of the status quo and intermittent negotiations took place from 1960 to the 
present. This coincided with a period of rapid economic integration and, later, democratization. 
Japan and South Korea completed negotiations over normalization of bilateral relations in 1965 
with the conscious decision to “shelve” the Liancourt Rocks dispute for future generations to 
resolve.177 By this point, bilateral trade as a percent of South Korean GDP had risen to near-
Korean War levels at 1.8 percent, which increased rapidly as Japan contributed ever more to 
South Korea’s development.178 Over the next several decades, South Korea’s economic growth 
“required Japanese capital and technology…. Both sides pushed aside their historical animosity 
and emotional conflicts…, [but] Japanese and South Korean leaders made no attempt to build a 
bridge of genuine understanding.”179 Thus, while Seoul did not initiate negotiations over the 
Liancourt Rocks, neither did it initiate militarized action since South Korea required continued 
good relations with Japan for the loans and investment that made economic growth possible.  
The democratization of South Korea brought with it an improvement of Korean-
Japanese relations, with South Korean President Roh Tae Woo calling for a breaking of “the 
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shackles of the past” in the first ever speech to the Japanese Diet by a South Korean 
President.180 However, the dispute has yet to be settled and continues to serve as a wedge 
between closer relations. In April 2014, Japan reiterated its claim to the islets, leading to a swift 
rebuke by the South Korean foreign ministry, saying that Japan’s territorial claims “damage not 
only the South Korea-Japan relationship but also peace and stability in Northeast Asia.”181  
The continued dispute over the Liancourt Rocks demonstrates the audience cost that 
dyadic democracy can bring to a dispute. In cases like that between South Korea and Japan that 
include the heavy weight of history, democratic institutions add an audience cost that make 
negotiating a solution nearly impossible. Thus, while democracy and economic integration 
make militarized action less likely, the weight of historical animosity can make negotiations 
more challenging. 
 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 Territory is the basis of modern states, both in the political foundation of sovereign 
countries and the conceptual underpinning of nationhood. Disputes over territory therefore 
generate strong governmental reactions and passionate popular responses. It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that territorial disputes have been the leading cause of war throughout the 
twentieth century. However, while territorial disputes are the foremost cause of war, the 
majority of territorial disputes do not lead to war. Understanding the differences between the 
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territorial disputes that result in war and those that do not is essential to better understanding 
the causes of war and, accordingly, the way to peace.  
 This research examined the theory of economic interdependence, the theory of the 
clash of civilizations, and the theory of democratic peace and their connection with the 
peaceful or violent resolution of territorial disputes.  
Through a quantitative analysis of territorial disputes from 1950 to 1995, economic 
interdependence was proven to have a significant effect on challengers’ decisions to initiate 
negotiations versus militarized action as well as a significant effect on challengers’ decisions of 
how much to escalate. Both of these findings were significant and in the direction hypothesized 
by the theory of economic interdependence.  
Economic interdependence was also found to be significant in challengers’ decisions to 
offer concession, but opposite the expected direction, with more interdependence leading to 
fewer concession. This finding may illustrate the existence and effect of relative economic 
dependence and the power countries can exert on economically dependent partners. This 
puzzling result and the possible mechanisms through which it works would be ideal avenues for 
further research.  
The case studies explored in chapter six supported these findings. In the Sino-Indian 
dispute, low levels of economic interdependence created few incentives to solve the dispute 
peacefully, eventually resulting in the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War. The case of the Sino-
Japanese dispute over the Senkaku illustrated the pacifying effect of extensive economic 
interdependence, though it also introduced the possible limits to the theory in the most recent 
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acrimony caused by the dispute. The Taiwanese-Japanese dispute over the islands presents a 
similar case supporting the pacifying effect of economic interdependence. The Korean-Japanese 
dispute over the Liancourt Rocks represents a case where initial low levels of economic 
interdependence helped create the environment for a 1952 militarized dispute, and where 
growing economic interdependence avoided further military confrontation and alleviated some 
of the animosity over the dispute. 
The theory of the clash of civilizations was unsupported by the results of the 
quantitative analysis, with no significant relationship between the difference in disputants’ 
values and the peaceful or violent outcome of the dispute. However, these results are likely the 
consequence of inadequate data and measures. The case study of the Sino-Indian territorial 
dispute introduced a possible causal mechanism of how cultural difference can lead to conflict 
in disputes. India’s cultural differences with China were amplified by its cultural similarities with 
Tibet, which resulted in a falling apart of Sino-Indian relations when Jawaharlal Nehru 
supported the Dalai Lama during the Tibetan uprising of 1959. Further research and better 
measures are required to better understand this complex connection. 
The theory of democratic peace was supported in analysis of territorial disputes from 
1919 to 1995. Both the monadic and dyadic versions of the theory had a significant effect on 
challengers’ decisions to initiate negotiations versus decisions to initiate militarized action. 
However, only dyadic democracies were found to have a significant impact on challengers’ 
decisions of how much to escalate. Neither were found to have a significant effect on decisions 
to offer concessions.  
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The case studies in chapter six support these findings. In the Sino-Indian territorial 
dispute, Beijing did not have to account to its people in its decision to initiate military action, 
lowering the costs of a violent solution. The absence of dyadic democracy also proved 
important, as decision-makers in New Delhi did not believe Beijing’s threat to respond to India’s 
forward policy with force because of China’s domestic turmoil and lack of audience cost that 
would have made the threat more credible. In India’s decision not to initiate military action 
following the 1962 border war, democracy paid an important role as leaders reflected on the 
political toll the previous conflict had inflicted on the Nehru administration. Meanwhile, in the 
Taiwanese-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands, the democratization of Taiwan led to a 
revitalization of relations and helped instigate an eventual fishing agreement over the territory. 
The Korean-Japanese dispute over the Liancourt Rocks best demonstrates the efficacy of 
democratic peace, with South Korea under the authoritarian Syngman Rhee launching 
militarized action against Japan, but with diplomacy and negotiations winning out after the 
democratization of the country. 
The effect of economic integration on the decision of challenger states to negotiate is a 
subject that deserves further study. The effect of cultural similarities and differences is another 
area ripe for deeper analysis; annualized and more exact measures would be especially useful 
in furthering the study of territorial disputes and culture. Historical animosity and its effect on 
peaceful or violent resolutions of territorial disputes also merits closer attention. Finally, further 
research on how economic dependence, or unequal economic interdependence, could lead to 
peace would add significantly to economic interdependence literature. 
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In conclusion, this research supported the theories stating that economic integration 
and democracy support peaceful negotiations over military action. However, that does not 
mean that democracy and trade are the final solution to ending conflict. The increasingly 
acrimonious disputes over the Senkaku Islands between China and Japan and over the 
Liancourt Rocks between South Korea and Japan show the possible limits to the pacifying 
effects of economic integration and democracy. Nonetheless, the proliferation of trade and 
democracy shows promise in increasing the likelihood of peaceful negotiated solutions to 
territorial disputes around the world. 
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